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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
SHAYNE E. TODD, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20041012-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted limited certiorari review of the court of appeals' decision in State 
v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, 98 P.3d 46 (attached in Addendum A). See also Addendum 
B (Order Granting Certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004)). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Does "an oral announcement of sentence prior to entry of judgment 
constitute^ an imposition of that sentence for purposes of rule 24(c) of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure"? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 7,95 P.3d 276; Thomas v. Color Country 
Management, 2004 UT 12, \ 9, 84 P.3d 1201. "The interpretation of a rule of procedure is 
a question of law that [this Court] reviews for correctness." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 
| 16, 16 P.3d 540; see also State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v. 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, If 9, 31 P.3d 615, affd 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal requires interpretation of rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, both of which are attached in Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 30, 1999, defendant was charged by information with one count of 
murder, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1998), and one 
count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree felony 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1998) (R. 2-9). The charges stemmed from 
the shooting death of his estranged wife as defendant drove the couple's Ford Blazer 
through a parking lot while she clung to the driver's door (R. 669:52, 68-69, 124, 136-37, 
138; State's Exhibit #3). A weapons enhancement applied to the murder charge, and a 
habitual violent offender enhancement applied to both charges (R. 3). Defendant pled 
guilty to the possession charge, and the State agreed to drop the enhancements (R. 244). 
After a nine-day trial, the jury convicted defendant of murder (R. 464, 466; R. 677:4). 
The procedural events relevant to the issue on review span nearly two years: 
March 14, 2001 The trial court announced defendant's sentence at the 
sentencing hearing (R. 678:18-19). 
2 
March 22, 2001 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial (R. 516-18) 
(attached in Addendum D).1 
March 28, 2001 The court entered its sentencing order (R. 685-86) 
(attached in Addendum E). 
January 23, 2003 The trial court denied defendants motion for a new 
trial in a signed, written order (R. 592-94). 
February 21, 2003 Defendant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which 
transferred the case to the court of appeals (R. 632-33, 
656). 
The court of appeals moved sua sponte for summary dismissal, seeking 
memoranda on the jurisdictional issue of whether defendant's motion for a new trial, 
which he filed between announcement of sentence and entry of judgment, was timely 
filed. The court later withdrew its motion and ordered the parties to address the issue in 
their briefs (Court Order dated August 22, 2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 28th, 1999, defendant shot his estranged wife, Stephanie, in the head 
with a 10mm pistol while she hung onto the driver's door of the Blazer defendant drove 
!The clerk stamped the sentencing order on March 28, 2001, but did not formally 
enter it into the docket. Both parties have treated the order as "entered" on that date for 
purposes of this appeal. But see Pet. for Cert, at 8 n.2 (arguing for the first time that "the 
judgment was entered on June 23, 2003" when the court of appeals supplemented the 
record on appeal with a copy of the judgment, and the prior notice of appeal was therefore 
valid pursuant to rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). Defendant has waived 
any challenge to the date on which the judgment was entered because: 1) he did not raise 
the issue until he filed his cert petition; and 2) having raised it in his cert petition, he did 
not argue it in his opening brief. See Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 442, 443-44, n.14 
(Utah 1995). 
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through a parking lot at speeds between fifteen and thirty-five miles-per-hour (R. 669:52, 
68-69,124,136-137, 138; State's Exhibit # 3). Stephanie dropped from the Blazer, 
unconscious and bleeding profusely from the wound to her head (R. 669:137-39). The 
Blazer immediately sped out of the parking lot without slowing down (R. 669: 55, 137-
38, 153-54). When the paramedics arrived, they pronounced Stephanie dead (R 669: 
138). A few days later, defendant was apprehended at a relative's house in Sunset, Utah 
(R. 670: 381-82; R. 671:559-61; R. 673: 788-89). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellate court's jurisdiction depends upon the timeliness of petitioner's 
notice of appeal, which depends in turn on the timeliness of his motion for new trial. A 
motion for new trial in a criminal case "shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). Petitioner filed his motion following the announcement of 
sentence at the sentencing hearing and before entry of judgment. Precedent in this 
jurisdiction holds that a motion filed before judgment is untimely under the rule. That 
precedent is supported by the rules of appellate procedure relating to the filing of a direct 
appeal. Because defendant's new trial motion was untimely, his notice of appeal—filed 
nearly two years after the court entered the final judgment in the case—was untimely, and 
the court of appeals properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. 
4 
Defendant's arguments that any adverse interpretation of rule 24(c) should not 
apply to this case should be rejected as they are not within the scope of this Court's grant 
of certiorari review. They fail in any event. The court of appeals' interpretation of rule 
24(c) does not represent either a "new rule" or a "clear break with the past" so as to 
prevent its retroactive application. Regardless, application to this case of the clarification 
announced herein is not a retroactive application and is generally permitted under 
standard appellate procedure. 
As established by this Court's long-standing precedent, defendant may pursue 
post-conviction proceedings in which he will have a full and fair opportunity to establish 
his claims of entitlement to re-sentencing for purposes of pursuing a direct appeal. 
Nothing in this case establishes that the remedy is in any way inadequate or unfair under 
the facts of this case. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, FILED PRIOR TO 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, WAS UNTIMELY UNDER RULE 24(C), 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THEREFORE 
FAILED TO CONVEY JURISDICTION TO THE COURT TO 
CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S APPEAL 
The court of appeals had jurisdiction over defendant's appeal only if it was timely 
filed. See State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah App. 1998). The appeal in this 
case would be timely filed if defendant complied with either rule 4, Utah Rules of 
5 
Appellate Procedure, or rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 4 provides 
that a notice of appeal is timely filed if it is "filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 
4(a). Rule 4(b) provides that "if a timely motion is filed in the trial court (1) for a new 
trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,... the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new t r i a l . . . . " Utah R. App. P. 
4(b). Defendant's notice of appeal was filed nearly two years after entry of the trial 
court's final judgment. The notice of appeal was filed twenty-nine days after entry of the 
order denying defendant's motion for a new trial. If defendant's new trial motion was 
"timely" filed, it would have tolled the running of the time to perfect an appeal until a 
ruling on that motion was entered, and the notice of appeal filed following entry of the 
order denying the motion would have conferred jurisdiction over defendant's appeal to 
the appellate courts. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b). 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a motion for a new trial 
is timely if it is "made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such further 
time as the court may fix during the ten-day period." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). The 
timeliness of a rule 24 motion is crucial: "An untimely motion for a new trial has no 
effect on the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal." Burgers v. Maiben, 652 
P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982). Further, there is no provision in rule 4 for a pre-judgment 
motion to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (addressed 
6 
to "post-judgment" motions and orders). Defendant argues that "imposition of sentence" 
occurs at the sentencing hearing when the trial judge announces the sentence, not when 
the final written judgment, sentence, and commitment is entered thereafter. Pet. Br. at 8-
21. Under his interpretation, his new trial motion—filed eight days after the sentencing 
hearing—would be timely, would toll the running of the time for appeal once a judgment 
was thereafter entered, and would render timely the notice of appeal filed nearly two 
years later following a decision on his new trial motion. Id. 
The court of appeals rejected defendant's argument, finding instead that 
"imposition of sentence" as used in Rule 24(c) meant completion of sentencing by entry 
of a final written order imposing sentence. See State v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, \ 19, 98 
P.3d 46. Because defendant's motion for a new trial preceded entry of the judgment, it 
was untimely and did not act to toll the time for filing defendant's notice of appeal. Id. at 
122. See also State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah App. 1998) (a premature 
motion for new trial does not affect the running of the time for filing an appeal). Absent 
a timely notice of appeal, the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to reach the merits 
of defendant's appeal and properly dismissed the appeal. Id. 
A. The Language and Logic of Criminal Rule 24 Require a Motion for 
New Trial to be Filed After Entry of Judgment 
Statutory Construction Principles. When interpreting the rules, this Court 
applies principles of statutory construction. See State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, \ 31,20 P.3d 
271 (quoting Butler v. Naylor, 1999 UT 85, If 9, 987 P.2d 41). The Court looks to the 
7 
plain language of the rule and "assumes that each term in the statute was used advisedly; 
thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused 
or inoperable." Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 
1991). "The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions 
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 'with other statutes 
under the same and related chapters.'" State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, \ 8, 63 P.3d 667 
(quoting Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, % 17, 5 P.3d 616) (additional quotations omitted), 
cert denied, 540 U.S. 820 (2003). Under these well-settled principles, the court of 
appeals' reading of rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is correct. 
Judicial precedent involving rule 24. The narrow legal question raised by this 
appeal is whether a motion under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is 
filed before entry of judgment is "made within 10 days after imposition of sentence" and 
is therefore "timely" under rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Defendant's argument focuses on defining "imposition" and "entry of judgment," 
ultimately concluding that "imposition of sentence" and "entry of judgment" "are separate 
events" and that the triggering event in the timeliness provision of rule 24(c) is the oral 
announcement of sentence, not the subsequent entry of judgment. Pet. Br. at 8-11. The 
court of appeals, however, recognized that the triggering event is the "imposition of 
sentence," and that more than "the oral indication of a sentence" is necessary to constitute 
the "imposition of sentence[.]" Todd, 2004 UT App 266, f 18. The decision recognizes 
8 
that "imposition of sentence" in the criminal context necessarily encompasses "entry of 
the [written] order imposing sentence^]" Id. at % 19. 
State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239 (Utah App. 1998), referenced by the court of 
appeals, is the first published opinion to analyze the appellate implications of a rule 24 
motion filed before entry of judgment. Vessey holds that the language of rule 24 is 
"plain," and that such a motion is premature and thus untimely. Id. at 1240. The opinion 
provides: 
The language of the rule [24(c)] is clear. The rule does not provide 
for timeliness of motions filed after announcement, but prior to entry of 
judgment, as is the case with rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Rather, rule 24 requires that a motion for new trial be filed 
within ten days after imposition of sentence. 
Id. (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).2 The court went on to determine that, 
because the motion filed "after conviction[] but before sentencing" was premature and 
hence untimely, it did not amount to the requisite "post-judgment motion" which would 
have tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal. Id. The inescapable implication of the 
ruling is that, absent the express distinction between announcement of sentence and entry 
2Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: 
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal 
filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before 
the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed 
after such entry and on the day thereof. 
9 
of judgment in the rule, the reference to "imposition of sentence" necessarily 
encompassed both aspects of sentencing. Id. 
Two years after Vessey, this Court touched upon the same issue and "implicitly 
upheld Vessey in State v. Gardner, 2001 UT 41, 23 P.3d 1043." State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 
122, ffi[ 5-6, 63 P.3d 91. Gardner filed a motion to suppress. Gardner, 2001 UT 4 1 , \ 2 . 
After his motion was denied, he filed a motion to reconsider based on what he asserted 
was new evidence. Id. Three days later he entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the 
suppression issue for appeal. Id. At sentencing, the trial court "allowed him to amend 
his previously filed motion to reconsider as an amended motion to reconsider his motion 
to suppress." Id. at f 3. On appeal, the State argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
because Gardner's motion to reconsider did not fit within any of the categories of post-
judgment motions that toll the time for appeal under appellate rule 4(b). Id. at f^ 5. 
This Court "construe[d] defendant's motion for reconsideration in this case as a 
motion for new trial." Id. at ^ 7. It further "construe[d] defendant's amended motion, 
which bears the same date as the judgment, sentence and commitment, as a motion filed 
in response to the imposition of sentence." Id. at f^ 8. This Court held that the amended 
motion was filed "in response to"—that is, after—sentence under rule 24 because it bore 
"the same date as the judgment, sentence, and commitment[.]"3 Id. In other words, the 
3
"[I]n response to" necessarily translates as "after" because, under rule 24(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the motion must be brought within ten days after 
imposition of sentence. 
10 
motion was timely filed under rule 24(c) because it was filed after the written judgment 
and not prior thereto. See id; see also Vessey, 957 P.2d at 1240. As in Vessey, the focus 
of the Court's concern was on the entry of the written judgment, which act completes the 
trial court's sentencing of defendant and is necessary to the "imposition of sentence." 
A year later, this Court again reaffirmed Vessey in State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, \ 
6. Putnik filed his motion for a new trial "[a]fter trial but before sentencing[.]" Id. at f 1. 
This Court rejected a challenge to the timing provision of rule 24(c) and relied on Vessey 
to affirm the dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In so doing, the Court 
reiterated: 
In State v. Vessey, the court of appeals held that a motion for a new 
trial filed prior to the imposition of sentence was not timely. 957 P.2d 1239 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). The court of appeals explained that The rule does 
not provide for timeliness of motions filed ... prior to entry of judgment....' 
Id at If 5 (quoting Vessey, 957 P.2d at 1239-40). 
This line of cases fully supports the court of appeals' determination in this case 
that "imposition of sentence" extends beyond "the oral indication of a sentence" to 
include the entry of judgment. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, \ 19. 
Related precedent. To further support its clarification of the phrase "imposition 
of sentence," the court of appeals pointed to two cases which establish: 1) the mere 
announcement of a sentence does not prevent entry of a different sentence, and 2) in such 
a situation, the defendant has still "only been sentenced once for the crime" where only 
one written sentencing order is entered to complete the sentencing process. See Todd, 
11 
2004 UT App 266, ffi[ 15-18 (citing State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1995), 
cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996)), and State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah App. 
1991) (per curiam)). In other words, sentencing is not fully and finally imposed until 
entry of a written sentencing order. 
In each of these cases, the defendants received two sentencing hearings, after 
which a single written judgment was entered. See Wright, 904 P.2d at 1102; Curry, 814 
P.2d at 1150. The sentence that was announced at the initial sentencing hearing in each 
case was not the same sentence that was ultimately entered in the matter See Wright, 904 
P.2d at 1102 (entry of final sentence delayed by court to review presentence report, after 
which the court entered a written order that omitted a probationary period originally 
announced); Curry, 814 P.2d at 1150 (entry of final sentence delayed at defendant's 
request for a ninety-day evaluation, after which the judge ran the sentences consecutively 
rather than concurrently, as originally announced). The appellate court in each case 
determined that the sentence originally announced was neither final nor appealable until 
reduced to writing. See Wright, 904 P.2d at 1103; Curry, 814 P.2d at 1151. In other 
words, sentencing was incomplete. Further, neither defendant had been sentenced more 
than once for their crimes, and sentencing was completed "when the written sentencing 
order was entered[,]" not upon oral pronouncement of the intended sentence. See Todd, 
2004 UT App 266, ffif 16, 18 (citing Wright, 904 P.2d at 1103, and Curry, 814 P.2d at 
1151). 
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Where the plain language of rule 24c is devoid of any basis upon which to limit the 
scope of the term "imposition of sentence" to exclude the entry of judgment or to 
distinguish it from the oral sentencing component, these decisions provide additional 
support for the court of appeals' clarification that "imposition of sentence" equates to 
"entry of the order imposing sentence[.]" Todd, 2004 UT 266, f 19. Defendant provides 
no reasonable rationale for providing an interpretation of rule 24 which is inconsistent 
with these holdings that defendants were not "sentenced" upon oral pronouncement but 
only upon entry of the written judgment. The cases reinforce that entry of judgment is far 
from being a merely "ministerial" act (Pet. Br. at 9), but is an integral part of every 
sentence. See also State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978) (oral statements from 
the bench are not the judgment of the court; "it is the sentence itself which constitutes a 
final judgment from which appellant has the right to appeal"); see also State v. Bowers, 
2002 UT 100, % 4, 57 P.3d 1065 (it is not the announcement of the intended sentence at 
the sentencing hearing, but "'the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from 
which appellant has the right to appeal'") (quoting Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 886). A 
defendant is not "sentenced" until entry of the final sentencing order. See Gerrard, 584 
P.2d at 886; Wright, 904 P.2d at 1103; Curry, 814 P.2d at 1151. Hence, sentencing 
cannot be fully "imposed" prior to entry of the final sentencing order.4 
4Because the court of appeals' interpretation of rule 24(c) comports with the plain 
language of the rule and the precedent in this jurisdiction, resort to federal interpretations 
of corresponding federal rules to interpret rule 24 is unnecessary. See Vargas, 2002 UT 
13 
B. The Court of Appeals' Decision Avoids the Unnecessary Confusion 
Which Follows Defendant's Interpretation of the Rule 
The principles of statutory and rule construction provide that "the plain language 
of a rule 'is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other 
provisions in the same [rule]'" and with other rules. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, }^ 31 (applying 
the principles of statutory construction to interpretation of rules); see also Schofield, 2002 
UT 132, Tf 8 (providing for interpretation of statutes "'with other statutes under the same 
and related chapters5") (quoting Lyon, 2000 UT 19, If 17) (additional quotations omitted). 
The statutory words are not read literally where "such a reading is unreasonably confused 
or inoperable." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, % 34, 52 P.3d 1210 (rejecting an interpretation 
of a statute which would render part of the statute inoperable), cert denied, 537 U.S. 
1172 (Utah 2003). 
5, Tf 31, n.8 (quoting State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986)) 
(acknowledging the ability to look to federal rules but not relying on the federal 
counterpart of rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence, because of a conflict in the federal 
interpretation of the relevant part).Regardless, the federal equivalent to Utah's criminal 
rule 24 avoids the quandary presented herein by running the filing period for a new trial 
motion from verdict rather than judgment. See Fed. R. Crim. 33(b)(2). Prior to a 1998 
amendment, it ran the time from "final judgment." Id, Notes of Advisory Committee on 
1998 Amendment. 
Defendant's reference to a recent amendment of rule 35 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure is similarly unhelpful. The statute relates to correction or reduction 
of a sentence. The recent addition of a definition for "sentencing" promotes uniformity in 
the interpretation of the federal rule, but is neither binding nor relevant to the 
interpretation at hand where Utah's appellate courts have had no difficulty in interpreting 
the timeliness provision of rule 24(c). 
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The court of appeals5 interpretation of rule 24. The court of appeals' 
clarification that rule 24(c) requires that a new trial motion be filed following entry of a 
final judgment harmonizes with the rules of appellate procedure to provide for the filing 
of both the motion and a single, comprehensive direct appeal in an efficient and effective 
manner. Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, entitled "Motions post judgment 
or order" (emphasis added), pre-supposes that the listed motions are post-judgment, and 
works efficiently to effectuate appeals involving such motions. If a new trial motion is 
timely filed within ten days after entry of the judgment, as required by the court of 
appeals, it tolls the running of the time for filing an appeal which had begun upon entry of 
the judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) & (b); Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c); see Vessey, 957 
P.2d at 1240 (a timely post-judgment motion under criminal rule 24 would "toll[] the time 
for filing a notice of appeal" under rule 4); The time for filing the appeal does not begin 
again until entry of the order denying the new trial motion, at which point a timely-filed 
notice of appeal would effect a single, comprehensive appeal encompassing both 
defendant's conviction and sentence as well as the denial of the new trial motion. 
Defendant's interpretation of rule 24. In contrast, the court of appeals 
recognized that defendant's more literal reading of the language in rule 24(c) would result 
in procedural confusion when viewed in conjunction with appellate rule 4. See Todd, 
2004 UT App 266, \ 20. The panel voiced its concern through a hypothetical: 
. . . Defendant's interpretation [of rule 24], in certain circumstances, 
would require either two appeals in a single case or a single appeal, taken 
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prior to the entry of final judgment. For example, if the court announced 
sentence, a defendant immediately filed his motion for a new trial, and the 
court immediately entered its order denying the motion, but did not enter its 
order imposing sentence until some months later, in defendant's view, 
either the notice of appeal would have to be filed within thirty days of 
denial of the motion—months before the entry of final judgment—or two 
notices of appeal would be required: one filed within thirty days of denial of 
the motion and one filed within thirty days of the entry of final judgment. 
Id. 
This example is a clear and concise statement of a situation that may well occur 
under defendant's interpretation of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c). As the court 
recognized, the outcome is inconsistent "with the familiar policy favoring one appeal per 
case, which appeal should follow entry of final judgment. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 4; 
Utah R. App. P. 5; Utah R. Civ. P. 65B; Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (2002)[.]" 
Todd, 2004 UT App 266, \ 20. 
Defendant argues that the confusion voiced by the court of appeals would not 
materialize because of rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pet. Br. At 19-21. 
That rule provides 
. . . . Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal 
filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before 
the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed 
after such entry and on the day thereof. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(c) (emphasis added). Defendant claims that this section would apply to 
the court of appeals' hypothetical and would prevent the confusion. Pet. Br. at 20-21, & 
n.5. He argues that subsections (b) and (c) would combine to prohibit the hypothetical 
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defendant from filing a notice of appeal between the time the court orally denied his new 
trial motion and the time it entered its written order. Id. Once the order was entered, he 
claims, subsection (b) would require the defendant to file a notice of appeal within thirty 
days. Id. Subsection (c) would thereafter permit the same notice of appeal to be treated 
as being filed on the day final judgment was later entered. Id. In other words, the same 
notice of appeal timely filed within thirty days of entry of the order on defendant's motion 
would also be considered to be filed and become effective "some months later" under the 
court of appeals' hypothetical. 
Defendant's argument raises several concerns. First, upon filing the notice of 
appeal, the appeals process would be underway without the final judgment or order 
required by rule 3(a). See Utah R. App. P. 3(g) (requiring the trial court clerk, on receipt 
of the notice of appeal, to forward it for docketing in the appellate court). Defendant's 
interpretation would arguably increase the number of cases requiring special treatment on 
appeal to ensure the case was held pending entry of the final judgment. 
Second, the prefatory language of subsection (c) is susceptible to an alternative 
interpretation, generating additional confusion. The language "Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule . . . . " may be read as completely excepting from subsection (c) 
all cases involving the filing of one of the motions listed in subsection (b). Under this 
interpretation, subsection (b) would control the remainder of the case, and subsection (c) 
would not apply upon entry of the final judgment to permit the earlier notice of appeal to 
17 
encompass the judgment. Instead, as the court of appeals noted, defendant would be 
required to file a second notice of appeal under rule 4(a) within thirty days of the entry of 
the final judgment, imposing an unnecessary burden on the courts and on judicial 
resources. See Todd, 2004 UT App 266, f 20. 
Defendant's interpretation of rule 24 generates confusion and procedural concerns 
when read together with the appellate rules. The court of appeals properly clarified the 
language of rule 24(c) in a manner which harmonized the rule with the appellate rules and 
provided for the most efficient and effective handling of post-judgment motions and 
direct appeals. This latter interpretation best meets the requirements of the principles of 
statutory construction and should be affirmed. See Schofield, 2002 UT 132, \ 8 
(interpreting a statute in harmony with related statutes to accomplish the underlying 
purpose); Bluff 2002 UT 66, f 35 (rejecting, as impermissible under the plain language of 
the rule, an interpretation of a statute which would "render portions of the statute 
redundant, superfluous, and inoperable55); see also 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction § 45:12, at 81-82 (6th ed. 2000) ("It [is] a golden rule of statutory 
interpretation that, when one of several possible interpretations produces an unreasonable 
result, that is a reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would 
produce a reasonable result5'). 
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C. Defendant's Retroactivity Arguments Do Not Warrant Review: 
Alternatively, They Lack Merit 
Defendant argues that if this Court affirms the court of appeals' interpretation of 
the timeliness provision of rule 24(c), it should apply that interpretation prospectively and 
not retroactively. Pet. Br. at 21-23. In any event, he argues, it should not apply to this 
case because it would violate his constitutional rights to fair notice and due process. Id. 
at 24-29. 
Denial of Certiorari Review. This Court should not address these arguments 
because they are outside the scope of this Court's grant if certiorari review. The law is 
well-settled that this Court will review on certiorari "'[o]nly the questions set forth in the 
petition or fairly included therein' and for which certiorari is granted." DeBry v. Noble, 
889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). 
This Court granted cert solely on the issue of "Whether an oral announcement of 
sentence prior to entry of judgment constitutes an imposition of that sentence for purposes 
of rule 24(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure." Order dated Feb. 10, 2005 (Add. B). 
Defendant's arguments involving retroactive application and violation of constitutional 
rights are not fairly included in this statement. The petition specifically requests review 
"on the appropriate procedure to follow" in this case and seeks re-sentencing. Pet. for 
Writ of Certiorari at 20. These arguments were not included in the Court's review order. 
Consequently, defendant is precluded from certiorari review of his arguments. 
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Further, defendant's failure to raise the retroactivity issue before the court of 
appeals prevents review at this time. See DeBry, 889 P.2d at 443-44 ("Issues not raised in 
the court of appeals may not be raised on certiorari unless the issue arose for the first time 
out of the court of appeals' decision"). In the court of appeals, defendant implicitly 
recognized that an adverse ruling by the court would apply to him, prompting him to seek 
issuance of a "writ" in aid of the court's jurisdiction to permit his direct appeal to 
continue. Br. of Aplt. at 48-49. He made no retroactivity argument. In both his petition 
for rehearing and his cert petition, defendant again implicitly acknowledged that the court 
of appeals' decision applied to his case, prompting him to seek a remand for re-
sentencing. Pet. for Rehearing at 4-15; Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 12-20.5 Again, he 
made no retroactivity argument. Now, however, he argues against application of any 
adverse interpretation of rule 24, seeking an exception that would permit his appeal to 
proceed. Pet. Br. at 21-29. The issue did not arise for the first time out of the court of 
appeals' decision, and, having failed to timely raise this argument, defendant should be 
denied review. See DeBry, 889 P.2d at 443-44. 
In any event, his arguments are without merit. 
5He repeats the request for re-sentencing in his brief on cert. See Pet. Br. at 29-40. 
The State responds in subsection D, infra. 
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Retroactive application. Defendant argues that the court of appeals' 
interpretation of "imposition of sentence" should not be applied retroactively to his case, 
but only prospectively. Pet. Br. at 21-23. 
When a new rule governing criminal procedure constitutes a clear break with the 
past, it is not generally applied retroactively. See State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 354 
(Utah 1996) (declining to apply a new cautionary policy involving appointment of a city 
attorney to represent an indigent defendant to a case pre-dating the judicial announcement 
of the new rule); State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 508-09 (Utah 1997) (where "cure-or-
waive" rule is simply an extension of preexisting principles from past cases, it is not a 
"new rule" subject to prospective application only); State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123 
(Utah 1991) (declining to retroactively apply strict compliance of rule in taking of guilty 
pleas). Defendant's argument against retroactive application of the court of appeals' 
interpretation of rule 24(c) fails on at least two grounds. First, the interpretation does not 
constitute either a "new rule" or "a clear break with the past" where it merely confirms 
the meaning of a phrase in an established rule consistently with precedent. See Vessey, 
957 P.2d at 1240; see also Putnik, 2002 UT 122, fflf 5-6; Baker, 935 P.2d at 508-09 (rule 
that "fills a vacuum in the law by extending preexisting principles from past cases" is not 
a "new rule" for purposes of retroactive application). Absent any "clear break," there is 
no bar to retroactive application of the rule change. See Baker, 935 P.2d at 508-09. 
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Second, even if the clarification is viewed as a "new rule," its application to the 
case at bar does not amount to retroactive application. Under standard appellate 
procedure, "[a] new rule announced on direct appeal typically applies to the case in which 
it is announced." Id. at 509; see, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991) 
(new state constitution-based rule for eyewitness identification testimony found satisfied); 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987) (new rule for taking guilty pleas 
applied, allowing defendant to withdraw his plea). 
Application to this case. Defendant alternatively argues that if this Court affirms 
the court of appeals' interpretation of rule 24(c), it should not apply that ruling to him in 
this case because it would violate his state and federal constitutional right to fair notice 
and due process. Pet. Br. at 24-29. He claims that he lacked adequate notice as to the 
proper interpretation of rule 24(c) because the decision unexpectedly departs from 
decisions in other jurisdictions interpreting the language and articulates a "new standard" 
which he could not anticipate in time to preserve his direct appeal. Id. 
However, the court of appeals did not announce a "new standard" or otherwise 
deviate from the language in rule 24(c). Defendant had ample notice of how the relevant 
rule was interpreted in this jurisdiction by means of the decisions in Vessey, Gardner, and 
Putnik. His alleged reliance on decisions from other jurisdictions in conforming his 
actions to Utah's procedural rules is unreasonable and does not establish vagueness or 
ambiguity in Utah's rule. Pet. Br. at 26-27. 
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D. Defendant Abandoned His Request for Re-Sentencing; In Any Event 
He has an Adequate Remedy in Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Defendant Abandoned this Argument Below. Review of defendant's request 
for a remand for re-sentencing is inappropriate where he abandoned his claim below. See 
Bergv. Otis Elevator Co,, 64 Utah 518, 231 P. 832, 838 (1924) (denying a petition for 
rehearing, noting "It is a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that when an assignment 
is ignored in the briefs of the party who assigns the error, the alleged error is deemed 
abandoned and waived and is not thereafter subject to resurrection). 
Defendant initially requested a remand for re-sentencing in response to the court of 
appeals' sua sponte motion for summary dismissal of this appeal on jurisdictional 
grounds. Reply Br. of Aplt. at 22 (attached in Addendum F). Once the court of appeals 
withdrew its motion, defendant did not re-assert the claim until after the opinion issued. 
Defendant's attempt to resurrect the claim in his petition for rehearing was denied by the 
court of appeals. 
Accordingly, this Court should not reach the merits of defendant's request for re-
sentencing. See Berg, 231 P. at 838. 
Post-conviction is an adequate and effective remedy. Even on its merits, 
defendant's argument fails because post-conviction presents an adequate and effective 
remedy. Defendant argues that if this Court affirms the court of appeals' decision, it 
should invoke its supervisory, constitutional, or rule powers to order a remand for re-
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sentencing in the original criminal proceeding to prevent defendant from having "to 
forego his right to a direct appeal." Pet. Br. at 29-40. 
What defendant requests is not procedurally appropriate. "It is axiomatic in this 
jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring 
dismissal of the appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 616 P.2d 952, 
955 (Utah 1984). This Court has long-since established the appropriate method by which 
to address claims that a defendant has been denied his direct appeal. The appeal must be 
dismissed without more, after which defendant may seek his remedy by pursuing post-
conviction review in the trial court under the Utah Postconviction Remedies Act, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-101, etseq. (2001); rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). See State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, 264 
(Utah 1997); State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App. 1989) ("a convicted 
defendant's claim he has been denied his constitutional right to an appeal should be 
presented to the sentencing court pursuant to a motion for post-conviction relief). 
Twenty years ago in State v. Johnson, this Court held that a defendant is entitled to 
a post-conviction hearing on his allegations that he lost his right to appeal through his 
counsel's ineffectiveness. Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38. Only if he can demonstrate on post-
conviction that he lost his right to appeal through no fault of his own should he "be 
resentenced nunc pro tunc upon the previous finding of guilty so as to afford him 'an 
opportunity of prosecuting and perfecting an appeal, since the time for taking such appeal 
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would date from the rendition of the new judgment.'" Id (footnote omitted); see also 
Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1155, 1156 (Utah 1996) (post-conviction case 
recognizing that a defendant who knowingly forgoes his right to appeal is not entitled to 
re-sentencing). Johnson does not provide for automatic return to the original criminal 
proceeding without post-conviction review, as defendant claims. Pet. Br. at 30-31, 38 
n.6. 
More recently, in State v. Jiminez, this Court dismissed defendant's criminal 
appeal on the ground that it was untimely filed, then noted: "In dismissing the appeal, we 
recognize that our action may deprive this defendant of his constitutional right to an 
appeal. Therefore, he may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110." Jiminez, 938 P.2d at 265. The Court 
continued: "The trial court should then follow the procedure outlined in Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65(c). . . . The direct appeal is provided by means of the re-sentencing 
procedure outlined in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981)." Id. 
This established method provides defendant with an effective and adequate remedy 
in the post-conviction arena which will enable him to perfect a direct appeal, provided he 
establishes his entitlement to one. His summary and self-serving claims of entitlement in 
his brief are insufficient by themselves, and he presents no valid basis upon which this 
Court should find that resort to post-conviction is unnecessary or inadequate. His reliance 
on Johnson and Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981), is misplaced as both cases 
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involved the pursuit of post-conviction proceedings to establish an entitlement to re-
sentencing. Pet. Br. at 30-33. Further, the State is entitled to an opportunity to challenge 
defendant's claims and to establish that they are without merit. His claim of "good faith" 
and absence of fault as well as his suggestions of ineffective assistance of counsel warrant 
scrutiny, especially in light of the "clear" language of rule 24(c) as stated in Vessey and 
reaffirmed in Putnik Pet. Br. at 28, 29, 30, 33, 37, 40. The procedural posture of this 
case is not the appropriate forum for such scrutiny. See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38. 
The procedure outlined in Johnson and Jiminez provides defendant with a valid 
and appropriate avenue by which to protect his constitutional right to appeal from his 
convictions. This Court should reject defendant's attempt to manipulate the judicial 
system by attempting to by-pass procedural guidelines established by rule, by statute, and 
by prior case law. 
CONCLUSION 
'"An untimely motion for a new trial has no effect on the running of the time for 
filing a notice of appeal.5" State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah App. 1998) 
(quoting Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982)). For the reasons stated 
herein, defendant's motion for a new trial was not timely under the plain language of rule 
24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. As a consequence, no post-judgment motion 
tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal. Appellate rule 4(a) dictates that the time 
expired thirty days after the March 28, 2001, entry of the trial court's final judgment 
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pursuant to rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Defendant's notice of 
appeal, filed nearly two years later, was outside the time permitted by the rules, and the 
court of appeals properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See 
Todd, 2004 UT App 266, f 22. For this reason, the State respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
**1 Defendant Shayne Todd was convicted of 
murder, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203 (2003), and possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a second degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3) (2003) 
. Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to 
grant his motion for a new trial, which was based on 
allegedly improper statements made by the 
prosecutor during closing argument. Because 
Defendant's motion for new trial was not timely 
filed, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 Defendant and the victim were married, but 
had separated. In February 1999, the victim was 
living with her new boyfriend. Since their 
estrangement, the victim had maintained physical 
possession of a Chevrolet Blazer, which Defendant 
had purchased prior to their marriage. Defendant 
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permitted the victim to continue using the Blazer, 
on the condition that the boyfriend not drive the car. 
On February 28, 1999, Defendant, seeing the 
Blazer parked in front of the victim's house, decided 
to take the vehicle using a key he had retained. 
Defendant took the Blazer, along with some of the 
victim's personal property that happened to be 
inside the Blazer, including her purse. 
**3 When the victim noticed the Blazer was 
missing, she phoned the police, who told her they 
could not help her retrieve the car from Defendant 
because the car was titled in both their names and 
they were still legally married. Later in the day, the 
victim called Defendant, and they arranged to meet 
in a parking lot where Defendant would return the 
personal property. 
**4 That evening, the victim was driven by her 
brother to the agreed destination. They parked next 
to the already-arrived Blazer, and Defendant, who 
was still inside the Blazer, handed the victim's purse 
to her brother. Meanwhile, the victim exited the car, 
approached the driver's door of the Blazer, and 
began arguing with Defendant. Defendant began to 
drive away as the victim reached into the open 
window, but the victim held on to the door. The 
victim continued to hang on to the car as Defendant 
drove through the parking lot at increased speeds. 
The victim's brother, realizing what was happening, 
did a *48 U-turn and began to follow the Blazer.' 
Suddenly, her brother heard a loud popping noise 
and saw the victim drop to the ground. The Blazer 
then sped out of the parking lot without slowing 
down. The victim had been shot in the head and 
was pronounced dead by the paramedics who 
responded to the scene. A day later, Defendant was 
apprehended at a relative's house. 
**5 Defendant was charged with murder and 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, with a weapons enhancement applied to the 
murder charge and a habitual violent offender 
enhancement applied to both charges. Defendant 
pled guilty to the possession charge and, in 
exchange, the State dropped both enhancements. 
After a nine-day jury trial, Defendant was convicted 
of murder. 
**6 At trial, Defendant testified that he had 
brought the gun to the property exchange because 
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he feared the boyfriend and another friend of the 
victim. He also testified that the gun, cocked and 
ready to be fired, rested in his lap when he was 
seated inside the Blazer and that when the victim 
jumped onto the Blazer, she grabbed the gun, and 
they struggled for possession of the gun, which 
accidentally fired. 
**7 A sentencing hearing was held on March 14, 
2001, in which the trial court orally announced 
Defendant's sentences. Defendant filed a motion for 
a new trial on March 22, 2001. On March 28, 
2001, the court entered its written sentencing order, 
which constituted the final judgment in the case. 
Nearly two years later, by order entered on January 
23, 2003, the trial court denied Defendant's motion 
for a new trial. On February 21, 2003, Defendant 
filed his notice of appeal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
**8 Defendant raises one issue on appeal: Did the 
trial court err in failing to grant Defendant's motion 
for a new trial based on statements made by the 
prosecutor during closing arguments? However, 
upon request of this court, both parties also briefed 
the question of whether Defendant's motion for a 
new trial was timely filed. See Utah R.App. P. 4(b) 
(stating that timely motion for new trial postpones 
time for appeal to thirty days after entry of order 
disposing of motion). 
[1][2] **9 Subject matter jurisdiction "is derived 
from the law. It can neither be waived nor 
conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to 
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter 
may be urged at any stage of the proceedings', and 
the right to make such an objection is never 
waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 
(Utah Ct.App.1998) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999). 
ANALYSIS 
**10 On March 14, 2001, the trial court held a 
sentencing hearing, at which it orally pronounced 
Defendant's sentences. However, the trial court did 
not enter its written sentencing order until two 
weeks later, on March 28. [FN1] On March 22, 
between the time when the sentence was announced 
and when the sentencing order was entered, 
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Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. Nearly 
two years later, on January 23, 2003, the trial court 
denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, and on 
February 21, 2003, Defendant filed his notice of 
appeal. 
FN1. Pursuant to rule 22 of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, "[u]pon a verdict or 
plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall impose sentence and shall enter 
a judgment of conviction which shall 
include the plea or the verdict, if any, and 
the sentence." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(c). 
Therefore, in a Utah criminal case, a final 
judgment occurs when the trial court enters 
the written judgment of conviction, 
including the sentence, into the record. 
**11 Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states that "[a] motion for a new trial 
shall be made within ten days after imposition of 
sentence." Defendant argues that the trial court's 
oral ruling at the sentencing hearing constituted the 
"imposition of sentence" for purposes of rule 24(c). 
Thus, because his motion for a new trial was filed 
within ten days after the sentencing hearing, 
Defendant insists his motion was timely. [FN2] 
FN2. Although filed nearly two years after 
his motion for new trial, Defendant's notice 
of appeal would be timely if the notice was 
filed within thirty days of entry of the 
order denying the motion, see Utah R.App. 
P. 4(a) (stating that "notice of appeal ... 
shall be filed ... within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from"), assuming only that the 
motion for new trial was itself timely, i.e., 
filed within ten days after imposition of 
sentence. See Utah R.App. P. 4(b) (stating 
that timely motion for new trial tolls time 
for filing notice of appeal until "the entry 
of the order denying a new trial"). 
*49 **12 The State argues that "imposition of 
sentence" is not equivalent to the mere oral 
announcement of an intended sentence. Rather, the 
actual entry of the written order imposing sentence 
is what constitutes the "imposition of sentence," 
commencing the period for filing a timely motion 
for a new trial. See Utah R.Crim. P. 24(c). The 
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State argues that because the motion for a new trial 
was filed prior to the "imposition of sentence," it 
was "premature and thus untimely." State v. Putnik, 
2002 UT 122,ffi[ 5,8, 63 P.3d 91. 
[3] **13 " rAn untimely motion for a new trial has 
no effect on the running of the time for filing a 
notice of appeal.' " State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 
1240 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (per curiam) (quoting 
Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 
1982) (per curiam)). Because the motion for a new 
trial was untimely, the State argues that the time for 
filing the notice of appeal was not tolled. Thus, the 
State contends the notice of appeal had to be filed 
within thirty days of the entry of the written 
sentencing order, which occurred on March 28, 
2001. See Utah R.App. P. 4(a). Alternatively, the 
motion for new trial could have been filed within 
ten days after the imposition of sentence, i.e., entry 
of the sentencing order, in which event the notice of 
appeal could then be filed within thirty days of the 
order denying the motion. Given that neither of 
these scenarios occurred, the State contends that 
this court is without jurisdiction over this appeal. 
[4] **14 The jurisdictional issue in this case turns 
on whether the "imposition of sentence" under rule 
24(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is 
interpreted as the oral announcement of an intended 
sentence or entry of the written order imposing 
sentence. Although this precise issue appears to be 
one of first impression, Utah judicial opinions have 
discussed when a sentence is considered final for 
other purposes. 
**15 "It is the law of this state, as announced in 
State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct.App.1991) 
(per curiam), that a sentence is not entered until it 
has been reduced to writing and signed by the 
court." State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah 
CtApp.1995), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 
1996). Curry involved a defendant whose sentence 
was orally pronounced by the trial court, after 
which he filed a motion to set aside the sentence 
and requested a ninety-day evaluation. See 814 
P.2d at 1150. A hearing was held, and the court 
stated that it would not sign an order implementing 
the previously announced sentence and instead 
ordered a ninety-day evaluation of the defendant 
See id. Following the ninety-day evaluation, the 
court again pronounced its sentence upon 
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defendant. However, this time the sentences were 
to run consecutively rather than concurrently, as had 
been previously announced. See id. The defendant 
appealed, arguing that his due process rights were 
violated when the trial court imposed a more severe 
sentence than what had been first announced. See 
id. at 1150-51. 
**16 On appeal, this court held that "the oral 
statement from the court regarding defendant's 
sentence was not reduced to writing, and thus 
defendant's sentence was not entered until" after the 
second sentencing hearing when the sentence was 
actually reduced to writing. Id, at 1151. In 
reaching its conclusion in Curry, this court followed 
Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1971), which held that "a judgment and 
sentence is not final and appealable where the court 
orally finds defendant guilty and sentences him but 
fails to enter written findings of fact and a 
judgment" Curry, 814 P.2d at 1151 (citing Hinkins, 
481P.2dat54). 
**17 Additionally, in State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 
1101 (Utah Ct.App.1995), the trial court orally 
announced a sentence, then one week later stated 
that it would not implement the tentative sentence 
until it had a chance to review the presentence 
report, specifically stating "[t]here is no judgment, 
there is no sentence until I sign those papers." *5G 
Id. at 1102. The trial court, at a later hearing, 
sentenced the defendant, but this time without the 
benefit of a thirty-six month probationary period, 
instead imposing a prison term. Following the 
second sentencing hearing, the trial court signed 
and entered its written sentencing order. See id. 
**18 On appeal, this court "affirm[ed] the 
sentence imposed by the trial court," id. at 1103, 
noting that the defendant had "only been sentenced 
once for the crime," i.e., when the written 
sentencing order was entered. Id. Like Curry, 
Wright also follows the rule that a sentence is not 
appealable or otherwise final until entry of an order 
signed by the court. [FN3] Given these precedents, 
it is clear that the oral indication of a sentence does 
not constitute the "imposition of sentence" for 
purposes of determining the timeliness of a motion 
for new trial under Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 24(c). [FN4] 
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FN3. The principle that a judgment, 
sentence, or order does not become final 
until it is reduced to writing and signed by 
the court has been reaffirmed in any 
number of contexts. See, e.g., State v. 
Gardner, 2001 UT 41,f 10, 23 P.3d 1043 
(noting that "an appeal filed before a 
formal post-judgment order is entered is 
ineffective and a new appeal has to be filed 
within thirty days after the entry of the 
formal order"); State v. Crowley, 111 P.2d 
198, 198 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (stating 
that "[a]n unsigned minute entry does not 
constitute a final order for purposes of 
appeal"); Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2d 
655, 655 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) 
(holding that "[a]n unsigned minute entry 
does not constitute an entry of judgment, 
nor is it a final judgment for purposes of 
[appeal]"); State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978) (stating that oral 
statements made from the bench are not 
the judgment of the court and therefore are 
not appealable). 
FN4. Defendant cites to several cases 
from other jurisdictions in support of his 
argument that "imposition of sentence" and 
entry of a formal, written sentence are two 
distinct acts. However, these cases have 
no binding effect in Utah, are at odds with 
the rule consistently followed in Utah, and 
are logically unpersuasive. See, e.g., 
Kriebel v. United States, 10 F.2d 762, 764 
(7th Or. 1926); State v. Trunnel, 549 P.2d 
550, 551 (Alaska 1976); Rodarte v. State, 
840 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex.Ct.App.1992) 
(per curiam). 
**19 This conclusion is consistent with State v. 
Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239 (Utah Q.App.1998) (per 
curiam), in which this court examined "what 
constitute [d] a 'timely' motion for new trial" 
pursuant to rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, id. at 1240, and in light of the language 
in rule 4(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
which states: "[A] notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but 
before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial 
court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on 
the day thereof." Utah R.App. P. 4(c). In Vessey, 
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this court concluded that rule 24 ndoes not provide 
for timeliness of motions filed after announcement, 
but prior to entry of judgment, as is the case with 
rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure" 
with respect to notices of appeal. 957 P.2d at 1240 
(emphasis added). See Utah R.Crim. P. 24(c). 
There is simply no such language in rule 24. 
Therefore, filing a motion for new trial prior to 
imposition of sentence, i.e., prior to entry of the 
order imposing sentence, will not be treated as filed 
after entry, as permitted in certain situations by rule 
4(c), but rather must be regarded as untimely. 
**20 Our interpretation of the phrase "imposition 
of sentence," and the resulting jurisdictional rule, 
are consistent with the familiar policy favoring one 
appeal per case, which appeal should follow entry 
of final judgment. See, eg., Utah R.App. P. 4; 
Utah R.App. P. 5; Utah R. Civ. P. 65B; Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (2002) (stating that, 
ordinarily, "fa] person is not eligible for relief 
[under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act] upon any 
ground that," among other things, "could have been 
but was not raised ... on appear). In contrast, 
Defendant's interpretation, in certain circumstances, 
would require either two appeals in a single case or 
a single appeal, taken prior to the entry of final 
judgment. For example, if the court announced 
sentence, a defendant immediately filed his motion 
for a new trial, and the court immediately entered its 
order denying the motion, but did not enter its order 
imposing sentence until some months later, in 
defendant's view, either the notice of appeal would 
have to be filed within thirty days of denial of the 
motion—months before the entry of final 
judgment—or two notices of appeal would be 
required: one filed within thirty days of denial *51 
of the motion and one filed within thirty days of the 
entry of final judgment. 
[5][6] **21 "If an appeal is not timely filed, this 
court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Sejrato 
v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,H 7, 13 
P.3d 616, cert, denied, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). 
"When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it 
retains only the authority to dismiss the action." 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 
570 (Utah CtApp.1989). 
CONCLUSION 
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**22 Due to the untimeliness of the motion for 
new trial, the time period for filing the notice of 
appeal was not tolled, and therefore, the notice of 
appeal was untimely. Accordingly, we dismiss this 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
**23 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Presiding Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
98 P.3d 46, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2004 UT App 
266 
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Addendum B 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
The State of Utah, 
Respondent, 
v. 
Shayne E. Todd, 
Petitioner, 
Case No. 20041012-SC 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on November 24, 2004. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issue: 
Whether an oral announcement of sentence prior to entry of 
judgment constitutes an imposition of that sentence for purposes 
of rule 24(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
Addendum C 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) Amotion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entrv of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure's filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under 
Rule 50(b); (2) under-Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
Similarly, if a timely motion is filed in the trial court (1) for a new trial under 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or (2) to withdraw a plea 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, the time for appeal for all parties shall run 
from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying the 
motion to withdraw the plea. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be 
filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the 
trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, 
^any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed 
by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed 
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a 
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension 
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry 
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in 
am institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, ther 
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely fifing may be shown by a 
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives thp fircit nnfiV* 
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DAVID V. FINLAYSON (6540) 
OTIS STERLING, III (7636) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 




IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND SUPPORTING MEMO, 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TIME 
TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE, 
AFFIDAVITS AND TRANSCRIPTS 
CaseNo.991906743FS 
JUDGE: FUCHS 
COMES NOW the defendant SHAYNE E. TODD, by and through his counsel of record, 
and moves this Court for a new trial pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
This motion is based upon the following: The State improperly argued the state of the law and how the 
facts should be applied which confused the jury and violated Mr. Todd's right to counsel and a fair 
trial in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, sections 7,11 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. Mr. Todd requests a hearing and additional 
time to prepare affidavits and transcripts in support of his motion. 
1 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Mr. Todd was convicted by jury verdict of Criminal Homicide, Murder on January 23, 
2001. He was sentenced by this Court on March 14,2001. Mr. Todd's foremost claim of error is that 
during the closing arguments, the State misdirected the jury by arguing improperly that facts 
surrounding the shooting of the victim, which were not the cause of her death, could be used in 
consideration of Depraved Indifference and Act Clearly Dangerous theories of Murder. Defense 
counsel made a motion for mistrial or in the alternative, that those alternative theories be withdrawn 
from the jury. Counsel's motion and request was denied and the jury was not further instructed. 
During deliberation, the Jury submitted a question to the Court regarding the very issue of causation 
asking: 
The defense in their closing indicated that the only act we were to consider was the 
shooting of the gun. (Which was the actual action which led to Stephanie's death.) Mr. 
Finlayson said we were not to consider the drive through the parking lot with Stephanie 
hanging onto the Blazer as part of the act that led to her death; is this correct? 
The court did not notify counsel of the question but answered the question by telling the jury, "you 
can- the fact that she was hanging onto the Blazer was the factual testimony that was factual', but that 
in regards to their question, they had to look to the jury instructions for any answers" The question was 
written and made part of the record. The answer from the court was apparently in person and not 
written. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 24, this Court may grant defendant a new trial "in the interest of justice 
if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon [his] rights." This 
2 
Court has considerable discretion to grant a new trial. See State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 
1985); State v. Smith. 776 P.2d 929 (Utah 1989). 
I. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED HE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL OR 
WITHDRAW THE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES FROM THE JURY 
In sum, Mr. Todd's main contention is that the State presented evidence that the victim, 
Stephanie Todd, was killed from a gun-shot would to the head. There was no evidence that she died as 
a result of falling from the vehicle. Yet the State argued that the act of Mr. Todd driving the 1100 feet 
through the parking lot with Stephanie hanging on should be considered as part of the act in its 
alternative theories of Murder. The jury was clearly confused on the issue as evidenced by the 
question to the court. As a result, Mr. Todd was denied his right to counsel and a fair trial in violation 
of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 
7, 11 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and should be granted a new trial. 
Because of the amount of information presented in the nine day trial, counsel requests 
additional time to have transcripts prepared and to submit a supplemental memorandum. Counsel also 
requests a hearing. 
Respectfully submitted thi%^/jdav of March, 2001 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Dane Nolan of the Salt Lake District 
Attorney's Office t h i s^day of March, 2001. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case NO: 991906743 FS 
Judge{ DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Date: March 14, 2001 
Clerk: wondypg 
Reporter: AMBROSE, EILEEN 
Prouucutor: NOLAN, DANE C 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FINLAYSON, DAVID V 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
DJI'.O of birth: April 30, 1971 
Vi deo 
CJ1AWJKS 
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/23/2001 Guilty 
2. I'URCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 2nd Degree Felony 
Ploar Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/16/2000 Guilty 
IIBAR TNG 
Tho above entitled case comes before the court for sentencing. 
Oeffcndant. transported from the prison. 
Counaol addresses the court requesting the psychological records 
bo mado a part of the pre-sentence report. Court so orders. 
Court: orders DA to preserve all evidence pending an appeal. 
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HAR-29-01THU 03:15 PM hflX NU. 
CMnc No; 99190(3743 
Dntw: Mar 14, 2001 
SkWTENCB PRISON 
Daned on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than fiva years and which may bo life in the Utah State Prison. 
Tiei'Mid on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT ia to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKU County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
fiVJOTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders count 1 and count 2 to run consecutive. Also this 
cassn ia to xim consecutive with any others defendant is serving 
Lime on. 
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Addendum F 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SHAYNE E. TODD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030157-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for murder, a first degree felony offense 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999), and possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a second degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503(3) (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
2. Section 78-2a-3(l)(b) and Boezess Ensure This Court*s Authority to Consider 
the Issues on Appeal in this Matter. 
The state claims that if this Court considers the notice of appeal to be untimely, the 
Court must dismiss the appeal. That would be unfair to Todd. As set forth in the opening 
Brief of Appellant, November 5, 2003, this Court filed a Sua Sponte Motion for Sum-
mary Disposition in this case, and asked the parties to state why the appeal should not be 
dismissed. (Sua Sponte Motion.) In response, Todd maintained the notice of appeal was 
timely. He asked the Court to proceed with the appeal on the merits. (See. Memorandum 
in Opposition to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Dismissal, dated May 28, 2003.) 
In the alternative, Todd requested remand for resentencing nunc pro tunc so that 
he could file an amended notice of appeal before proceeding to full briefing on the 
issues. (IcL); see Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, THfl0-l 1, 24 (resentencing is 
appropriate where a defendant, who wishes to timely appeal, files an untimely notice due 
to circumstances that are not his fault). This Court then withdrew its sua sponte motion 
and ordered full briefing. (Order, dated August 22, 2004.) There is no reason now to 
delay resolution of the appeal on the merits here. 
Assuming arguendo the notice here was untimely, controlling authority supports 
this Court's jurisdiction over the case. Pursuant to § 78-2a-3(l)(b), a remedy exists: this 
Court may issue any process necessary "in aid of its jurisdiction" over the appeal. 
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981), is in accord. There, defendant was 
convicted of manslaughter on June 19, 1978. IcL at 40. On January 3, 1979, defendant 
22 
filed a notice of appeal. Neither the parties' briefs on appeal nor the record "disclosed 
any facts explaining why defendant's appeal was submitted so far out-of-time." Id. After 
briefing, the supreme court dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. Id. 
When the case was returned to the lower court, defendant filed a writ of habeas 
corpus and developed a record to reflect why the notice of appeal was untimely. Id. at 
40, According to the record, after defendant was convicted, he advised counsel he did 
not want to appeal When defendant arrived at the prison, he changed his mind. He 
wrote a letter to his attorney, and the attorney received the letter on "July 18th, the day 
before the time for appeal expired." Id. The attorney took no action. Id. Based on those 
facts, the habeas court granted defendant permission to file an "out-of-time appeal" and 
directed defendant "to return to the district court for further relief if [the Utah Supreme 
Court again] refused to entertain that appeal." Id. at 40. Defendant again proceeded with 
the appeal, only to have the supreme court reject it. When defendant returned again to the 
habeas court, that court entered an order to grant the habeas petition and to release the 
defendant from prison if the supreme court refused to address the substantive merits of 
the case. Id at 41. At that point in the proceedings, the state appealed. Id. 
The supreme court considered the issues and identified an acceptable solution to 
the matter. Id at 42. Specifically, the court considered the post-conviction habeas relief 
to be appropriate when "defendant's claim is based on allegations that have not been 
established as facts " Id. (emphasis added). However, once facts supporting the reason 
for an untimely notice of appeal have been developed, "it would be needlessly circular to 
23 
require that defendant return to the district court to re-establish the facts by a post-
conviction hearing and then to be resentenced to qualify for a direct appeal. In this 
exceptional circumstance, there is a more direct remedy." Id. The court used the 
common-law writ4 as a basis for reaching the criminal case where the record supported 
defendant's right to appeal, and it supported that the right was compromised due to 
statutory time limits and through no fault of the defendant. Li. at 41-42. Boggess. sup-
ports application of the common-law writ. It has broad application. It should not be read 
to support that a defendant must proceed through "the habeas corpus merry-go-round," 
kL at 41, as described there, before he may be heard on appeal in the criminal case. 
Indeed, in Boggess, the facts developed in the habeas proceedings and the 
common-law writ, opened the door for direct review. 
[W]here a timely appeal to this Court was prevented by circumstances that 
admittedly constituted a denial of defendant's constitutional rights to appeal, we 
exercise our discretion to issue the common-law writ of certiorari to bring up the 
record and allow defendant a direct review in this Court of the alleged errors in his 
trial for manslaughter, on the merits, just as if he had taken an appeal within the 
statutory period. The briefs filed by the parties in No. 16232 are hereby received 
as the briefs in this case, with either party to have leave to supplement them within 
thirty days. 
4 When Boggess was published, the Utah Constitution empowered the appellate court to 
issue the "common-law writ of certiorari" in aid of jurisdiction. Boggess. 635 P.2d at 42; 
Utah Cons. art. VIII, § 4 (1953) (stating the "Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the exercise of that 
jurisdiction"). That power differed from the "various statutory enactments authorizing 
specialized uses of the writ of certiorari," in cases involving, e.g., public service 
commission orders or worker's compensation awards. Boggess. 635 P.2d at 42 & n.6. 
Today, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(2) and 78-2a-3(l)(b) (2002) allow the appellate 
courts to issue the writ and any process necessary in aid of their jurisdiction. 
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Id. at 43. The lessons ofBoggess apply here. 
The facts of record support Todd's intent to timely appeal. Todd filed a new trial 
motion within 10 days after the trial court imposed sentence in open court. (R. 678; 516-
18.) Todd filed a notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of an order on the new 
trial motion. (R. 592-94; 632-33.) To the extent the notice of appeal was untimely, it 
was through no fault of Todd. Todd respectfully urges this Court to exercise its 
discretion to issue the common-law writ of certiorari to allow direct review. Boggess « 
635 P.2d at 42-43* The briefs filed by the parties should be received for the substantive 
appeal from the criminal conviction. Id.; see also Barnard v. Murphy. 882 P.2d 679, 681 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("More specifically, 'the authority to issue a writ in aid of appellate 
jurisdiction "is not confined to the issuance of writs in aid of a jurisdiction already 
acquired by appeal but extends to those cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction 
although no appeal has been perfected"'") (cites omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Todd respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the conviction and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED th i s^day of d^JL , 2004. 
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